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THE STRATEGIC FACTORS
.
Factorsof Prediction versus Factors of Diagnosis
'FilE factors of strategic importance in the business
cycle may be classified into those that may serve as
means of prediction, those that may serve as means
of prompt discovery and gauging of current condi-
tions and of the stage of the cycle in which the coun-
try finds itself at any given moment, and those that
may be susceptible to control and may thereby serve
as means of controlling the course of business con-
ditions. The first group is the one to which business
men have hitherto paid most attention. The second
and third groups are those on which the possibilities
of long-run remedies really rest.
No one factor behaves with sufficient regularity
in relation to the general business cycle to serve as
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an infallible index of prediction. And no group of
factors can be so used with absolutely reliable results.
Prediction-factors may be classified into those which
represent some change of genuine initiatory influ-
ence and those which merely record the current
phase of the cycle, from which the next phase may
be expected to follow in about the usual time.
With regard to the first group, factors which nor-
mally take the lead cannot be counted on to do so in
every case. There is probably always some initiatory
factor or group of factors which could be picked out
by sufficient study aftet the event; but the factor
which plays this role in one instance may be replaced
by different factors in another instance. And there is
the ever-present possibility of some new and unique
factors, or of some more or less familiar factors play-
ing a new and unique role. Moreover, the minor
fluctuations of the factors always leave considerable
doubt as to whether a given factor has just reached
its cyclical low point or high point, or whether it has
merely experienced a brief interruption of a move-
ment which will shortly be resumed. Few have a suffi-
cient lead to make it possible to wait until their
cyclical turning-point is surely determined, and still
use them for predicting the corresponding cyclical
turning-point of general business; and these few are
too erratic in their behavior to make the prediction
certain.
As to the type of prediction system which merely
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records the current phase of the general cycle and
allows the observer to infer that the next will follow
in a normal time, the results are made highly uncer-
tain by the large variations in the length of cycles
and of their successive phases. And it is never safe
to predict, for example, the extent of a coming ex-
pansion by the extent to which a current depression
falls below 'normal', because such a 'normal' is al-
ways arbitrary or uncertain. Indeed a statistical trend
line, projected forward to the date of the latest ob-
servations, has little claim to be regarded as normal
with respect to current conditions.Non-cyclical
changes and disturbances are always likely to vitiate
it. Such a method might have succeeded fairly well
in 1921,butwould have failed utterly in 1929, or
at any time during the succeeding three years. On
this basis predictions of revival were repeatedly made
and repeatedly followed by further contraction.
The hope that the technique of prediction will
overcome these difficulties involves, paradoxically
enough, not optimism but pessimism. For it carries
with it the expectation that cycles of the present
type will go on their uncontrolled course for some
time to come; and that is precisely what must not be
allowed to happen, in the view of the more liberal-
minded of publicists and business men alike. Theo-
retically, predictions based on past experience should
have a tendency to falsify themselves by leading to
different conduct in the future; but so far there have
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been no very great evidences of such a tendency.
One reason why mere prediction will not put an
end to business cycles is that business men will use
the predictions to guide business policies of the same
basic sort they now follow: expanding to take advan-
tage of increasing demand and contracting to meet
declining demand and building up excess capacity
in the hope of increasing their proportionate shares
of the existing business. If expansion is predicted,
they will still take action which will tend to bring
the expansion about and to intensify it, though per-
haps more promptly than at present. If expansion
is expected soon to turn into recession, they will
then take the kind of action calculated to bring on
the recession and to intensify it, though perhaps
more promptly than they now do. As a result, they
may not carry either the expansion or the recession
quite so far as they now do; but to expect a greater
change than this would be highly optimistic.
The theory that business cycles can be controlled
as a result of successful prediction alone—if anyone
holds this theory—rests on the implied assumption
that cycles are due to the mistakes of judgment made
by individual business men. For this theory the pres-
ent study has yielded relatively little support, while
it has indicated the very large importance of causes
of a quite different sort; and the present writer be-
lieves this theory to be, in the main, false. The
trouble seems to be not so much that business menSTRATEGIC FACTORS IN BUSINESS CYCLES
mistake their interests—though that does happen,
and aggravates some of the difficulties—as that their
actual interests lie in doing the things which bring
on the cycle, so long as they are acting as individual
business men or representatives of individual busi-
ness interests. A business man who refused to ex-
pand his sales on the up-swing would gain nothing,
and one who refused to retrench on the down-swing
would probably go bankrupt. One who stabilized
his individual construction program would incur
some risks by building ahead of demand or by being
caught with inadequate reserve capacity in an ex-
pansion; and would not produce sufficient effect on
the whole business situation to receive in return any
substantial benefits in the way of stabilized demand
for his own products—as he might hope to do if all
business followed the same policy.
It seems to be a case in which the best policy for
an individual to follow in adjusting himself to the
existing bad conditions is not the same as the policy
by which the business community as a whole may
hope to get rid of the evil. It is only from a change
in these customary reaction patterns that we may
hope for real changes in the result. Something must
happen to bring about a condition in which the
response of business to a revival is not such as to
make the revival over-run itself and make a reces-
sion inevitable. If that can be brought about, it may
be that we shall not need infallible prediction; only
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prompt and reliable current diagnosis, to guide the
neutralizing policies which business or government
or both stand ready to put into effect.
The task of current diagnosis is far easier than
that of prediction, though still not easy. There are
plenty of indexes of general business activity which
tell us well enough how fast business is going at any
given moment. But this does not tell us our position
relative to that elusive standard called 'normal', nor
does it even dispose of the difficulty of determining
in what precise phase of the business cycle we are
at any time.
As to the first difficulty, the carrying of 'normal'
or 'secular' trends down to the current moment is
always a doubtful procedure, and hence the degree
of departure from such normal trends is equally
doubtful. Something may be accomplished, however,
by better measures (and better mobilized informa-
tion about them) of surplus capacity in construction,
and keener analysis of the relation of prices of securi-
ties to possible prospective earnings. It was well
known that stock prices during the great boom were
capitalizing future increases rather than current
earnings; but no systematic analysis appeared of the
extent of future increase in earnings necessary to
rationalize current prices. Had such an analysis been
made, it must inevitably have revealed that such
necessary future increases were beyond all human
possibility.
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As to the second 1difficulty—that of determining
what stage of the cycle business has momentarily
reached—a clear example is seen in the current de-
the duration and severity of which have
gone so far beyond usual experience and expecta-
tion. Many persons thought we had reached the low
point in January, 1930, and have thought so repeat-
edly since then, while we slipped down, with occa-
sional abortive revivals, into deeper and deeper
stagnation. And among persons who agree on the
kind of rescue work that can be effectively employed
there is still difference of opinion as to when it
should have been undertaken in the present depres-
sion. Would it have been effectiveif employed
promptly, or would it then have merely spent its
force while the worst impact of the depression was
still to come? Such chances as are implied in this un-
certainty we shall doubtless have to take; and they
will not be as great in the ordinary case as in the
present one, since this is, after all, more than a mere
business cycle.
And if measures of control are devised which have
some degree of effect, the character of the problem
will change. It will be neither the problem of pre-
diction nor that of determining precisely where we
are in the now-customary type of business cycle, but
of determining when an approximately regularized
economy has fallen below its normal trend of activ-
ity. And it will not be absolute activity that will
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count so much as activity relative to the full utiliza-
tion of our existing working force. In short, the state
of employment and unemployment will be a domi-
nant index.
Causes: A Partial Theory of Business Cycles
If we group the factors into those having directly
to do with production and those having directly to
do with consumption, it appears that they interact
so completely that it is impossible to say that one
group is the active one and the other the passive.
In this connection it may be worth while to break
into the sequence in one of the late phases of an
extreme depression like the present and follow it
backward toward ultimate originating causes.
Let us start with a shrinkagç of pur-
chases because of hoarding, this being attributable in
turn to the fear of losing one's job which arises
after curtailment of production has already begun
and further curtailments seem likely to follow. Cur-
tailments of production in the winter of 1931-32,
letus say, were made because normal bank credit
was difficult to obtain; and the extreme niggardli-
ness of the banks sprang from a state of fear engen-
dered by a wave of bank failures, due in turn to the
losses of the businesses that were the banks' debtors.
These losses were caused by the combination of
falling prices (mostly wholesale) and shrinking sales,
both traceable to a decline of business buying and
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ultimately to a decline in consumerspurchases
occurring earlier in the cycle than the particular de-
cline in which our backward-tracing analysis started.
In the present instance there was added tO this
and compounded with it a world-wide collapse in
basic commodity prices which was no part of an
ordinary business cycle. Without this the more usual
cyclical forces would have produced much milder
results. Recognizing this fact, we may go on to deal
with the typical cycle history.
The basic decline in consumers' purchases is a
common feature of all cycles, and is mainly conse-
quent upon an actual shrinkage in consumers' in-
comes, resulting in turn from a prior shortage of
general employment and lessened production in
industries at large. The earliest shrinkage in con-
sumers' purchases can hardly be due in any signifi-
cant degree to the fear of losing the job, since the
cause for that fear has not yet made itself manifest
to an extent sufficient to disturb the optimism that
marks a time of active business. The general curtail-
ment of employment and production which origi-
nates the decline of consumers' incomes includes a
falling-offin physical production of consumers
goods prior to any similar definite falling-off in con-
sumers' purchases. With this goes a much more in-
tense falling-off in the work of producing durable
goods(the reasons for which we have already
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traced), and which is preceded by a tapering-off of
the rate of increase.
This is accompanied by a curtailment of credit of
various sorts, and accordingly total expenditures
fall off more than consumers' current expenditures
out of current income. And while this curtailment
may be intensified by any actual falling-off in con-
sumers' incomes, the source from which itsfirst
manifestations arise may be no more than a cessa-
tion or slackening of expansion in the total amount
of producers' equipment or durable consumers'
goods, causing a positive decline in the rate of cur-
rent production of these commodities. This. may be
merely because supplies of equipment or durable
goods have caught up with demand. This in turn
implies that demand expands irregularly, and that
after an up-turn, production for a time expands
faster than what we may call the original expansion
of demand, and thus at a rate that cannot be per-
manently maintained.
These original expansions of demand may in their
turn arise, first, from merely chance happenings; or,
second, from the basic tendency which statisticians
express in curves of normal growth, starting with
something like a geometrical rate of increase, reach-
ing a maximum rate of expansion, and then tapering
off to a saturation-point. In such cases as we are con-
cerned with, the saturation-point is best expressed
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in a community with a growing population, or per-
haps in some instances even a stronger upward trend
representing normal per capita expenditure in a
country with a gradually rising per capita income.
The 'growth' in excess of this trend represents the
process by which a new good or a new process makes
its way to a fairly stable place relative to others, in
an expanding economic system. If it is an absolutely
new good the growth-curve may start from zero. If
it is a case of a change enlarging the normal place
held by an existing good, the growth-curve may be
superimposed on a secular upward trend, or differ-
ent growth-curves with different periods may be
superimposed on each other.
These normal growth-curves we may regard as
representing roughly certain causal forces which are
ultimate for our present purpose. They may have
to do with the development of new goods and of the
conscious and active desire for them, or with new
processes of production calling for increased invest-
ment in productive equipment. In either case there
is no reason to suppose that either the curves of nor-
mal growth or the chance fluctuations which are
combined with them have any inherent tendency,
in their essential nature, to move in cycles of either
three and one-third or of ten years. These inherent
tendencies, be it remembered, are factors which are
not to be observed unmodified in the statistics. The
actual statistical changes record the results of the
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entire chain pf cumulative sequences, returning on
themselves endlessly, which have been indicated in
a fragmentary way in the foregoing analysis. The
inherent tendencies of what we have chosen to call
the ultimate causal forces are so overlaid and trans-
formed by these sequences of secondary and tertiary
results that their original nature is buried, and can
only be gotten at by other methods of inference than
those of direct statistical tracing.
The development of new goods seems to reach
maturity in varying periods of time. The automobile
has required more than a generation, while minia-
ture golf ran its course in a few months. In general,
goods of large and enduring significance seem to
require considerably more than a ten-year period for
development. The same can be said of new produc-
tive processes, with modifications. The time required
to develop the potentialities of a basic idea such as
that of scientific management is as long or longer
than has been required by the automobile, but single
processes may be developed in a much shorter pe-
riod. There may be an initial stage of experimental
pioneering, followed by a putting of the method into
actual production, this involving some small but
appreciable demand for new equipment. If the
method proves its economic worth, there may be
virtually instant recognition of that fact, and a wave
of imitation, sweeping over the entire field as fast
as the character of the improvement admits and
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causing a very considerable demand for new equip-
ment. Schumpeter's analysis of intermittent move-
ments of pioneering followed by waves of imitation
is pertinent on this point and is the outstanding
theoretical treatment of it.'
As the work of overhauling production methods
tends to be to some extent concentrated in the de-
pression phase of the business cycle, the first appli-
cations of improved methods in actual production
probably have some corresponding tendency to con-
centrate toward the later stages of depression. This
would, as far as it went, tend to check a recession
or initiate a revival; and the waves of imitation,
occurring still later, would give a stronger impetus
to revival. Thus this particular type of growth-curve
may come to coincide with the general business
cycle, to the extent that the timing of the initial
pioneering is influenced by the cycle and is not a
wholly independent fact. As to how far this actually
happens, statistical measurement is well-nigh impos-
sible. It is so much a matter of the kind of problem
on which the regular executive staff focus their atten-
tion. The concentration of such developments may
be relatively slight, after all. And even this can only
be true of relatively minor developments; major
changes require a much longer period. They could
not be incubated, brought into successful applica-
1Thistheory, together with others, is summarized in W. C. Mitchell's
Business Cycles: The Problem and Its Setting, Chapter I.
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don and widely imitated, all in the course of one
depression and revival.
Whether this hypothesis be true or not, the actual
bulk of the installation of machines, as well as of the
actual growth of sales of new goods, is conditioned
by effective demand and so follows the course of the
general business cycle. The normal growth-curves
of which we have been speaking express the under-
lying forces as they would develop if unmodified by
these factors derived from the business cycle itself.
In all probability they have a wide variety of nat-
ural periods. Many of them, representing the experi-
mental development and subsequent general adop-
tion of fairly specific and limited technical devices,
may be prompt enough to be stimulated in their
early stages by the spur of hard times, and to reach
a considerable development during the subsequent
expansion of general business. But few would be so
short as to run their whole course in one business
cycle. It is difficult to ascrilRe the length of the forty-
month cycle to any natural periodicity of such
growth-curves. The safer assumption isthat the
growth-curves have a chance distribution, modified
by the business cycle in the ways already suggested.
The combined resultant of a number of these
growth-curves superimposed on each other would
naturally be a state of growth varying somewhat from
decade to decade and with shorter and slighter fluc-
tuations of an irregular sort. But there is still no
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reason to suppose that the combination of this com-
posite growth-curve with purely chance fluctuations
would show any natural tendency to run in cycles
of the familiar observed lengths. There is every
reason to suppose that these fundamental forces are,
in point of timing with reference to the general busi-
ness cycle, random forces.
If there is, as there certainly seems to be, a tend-
ency to a qualified regularity in the ups and downs
of business, its cause must be sought in the mechan-
ism whereby business reacts to these original im-
pulses. On the basis of the above analysis a theory of
the business cycle can be constructed which would
account for its salient features, as follows:
By way of starting-point we may take the impulse
leading to an up-turn of business. This impulse may
be one of a wide variety of possible sorts, or may
represent a combination of more than one. It may
be of the 'originating' type, or derived from a pre-
vious depression. It may affect output of producers'
goods or output of consumers' goods, either directly
or by way of the consumers' demand for them. 1.
Productionmay take an up-turn without waiting for
demand, owing to:(a) the removal of some specific
obstruction—for example, a strike;(b) the need for
replacement following a period when stocks in the
hands of producers, dealers or consumers were al-
lowed to decline, as may happen in a depression; (c)
the development of a more optimistic (or less pessi-
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mistic) feeling among producers, whatever may be
its source. 2. Demand for productive equipment
may take an up-turn without waiting for increased
demand for products, owing to:(a) changes in tech-
nical methods of production; (b) the development
of new goods in anticipation of demand, or for which
a potential demand appears to exist; (c) the need for
resuming maintenance and replacement which has
been temporarily postponed, as happens in a depres-
sion; (d) increased optimism, which may affect (a),
(b) and (c).Ashifting in consumers' demand
from one commodity to another may cause a demand
for equipment to produce the new commodity with-
out the possibility of an equivalent decrease, in the
same space of time, for the equipment to produce
the older and discarded commodity, thus giving rise
to a net increase in the demand for equipment. 4.
An upward inflection in the course of total con-
sumers' demand may take place, from causes not
dependent on prior increase of income(which
would have to rest on increased production), as a
result of:(a) the offering of attractive new goods;
(b) the using up of 'consumers' inventories';(c) a
more optimistic mood, (d) selling effort, or (e) in-
creased demand from abroad.
Except in the case of foreign purchases, an in-
crease of demand, not derived from a prior increase
of production, would necessarily carry with it at
first either an increase of consumers' credit or a de-
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crease of savings. The latter, be it noted, may not
result in a decrease of funds available for purchase
of productive equipment, since it may be more than
offset by an expansion of producers' credit.
•It will not be necessary to follow out the results
of all types of original impulse separately. If
we start with this fourth group, we shall take in on
the way all the essential features of the transmission
and spreading of the other types of impulse. For an
upward inflection in the course of 'original demand'
has its most substantial result in the shape of an
intensified upward swing in the output of means of
production and of durable goods. And this is a con-
dillon to which all the other types of 'originating
impulse also lead.
If this resulting increase in production responded
exactly and instantaneously to the original demand,
and were not affected by any further secondary con-
sequences, the derived curve would have the same
period of swing as the original curve, though the
timing of the peaks and troughs would be different,
the derived curve appearing to lead.2 But the de-
rived curve does not respond exactly and instan-
2 See Part H, Timing: Construction. See also Business Acceleration
and the Law of Demand, Journal of Political Economy, xxv, 2 17-35,
March,1g17; also Economics of Overhead Costs, chapter xix. Cf. also
Capital Production and Consumer-Taking—a Reply, Journal of Polit-
ical Economy, xxxix, 814-6, December, Thisis a reply to Ragnar
Frisch's The Interrelation Between Capital Production and Consumer-
Taking: Journal of Political Economy, xxxix, 646-54, October, '931.
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taneously to the original impulse, and it is reinforced
and modified by its own cumulative effects. It takes
time to produce the equipment and durable goods,
and meanwhile there is a shortage which sends prices
up. This in turn tends to cause an increase in specu-
lative buying and buying for storage, which reacts
cumulatively to intensify the rise in prices. Guided
by the rising prices rather than by a statistical canvass
of demand and supply, competitive producers launch
upon the production of more goods and equipment
than necessary to meet the requirements of the
original expansion of demand.
The expansion of business at rising price-levels is
financed and made possible by expansion of credit,
moving in response to demand. At the same time
the increased productive activity results in increased
distribution of wages as soon as the expansion of
production begins and before the new durable goods,
or the products of the new equipment, are actually
on the markets. The effect is an increase of general
purchasing power which both intensifies the original
impulse and spreads its influence over commodities
in general, thus further stimulating the demand for
productive equipment. The competing producers,
who had started to produce too much, may even
find that their first program is not large enough for
this new state of demand, and further expansion
may ensue, with further diffused effects of the same
sort as before.
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But equipment and stocks of durable goods are
catching up with requirements, which will not ex-
pand indefinitely. Not all the increased income is
spent, and some of what is 'saved' is probably tem-
porarily absorbed in the speculative markets for
securities without immediately taking effect in in-
creased purchases of producers' or consumers' goods.
By the time the market shows that requirements have
been caught up with, there is an over-supply either
in existence or in process of production. Production
of equipment and durable goods now slackens, prices
fall, the contraction in the basis of credit is intensi-
fied by forced sales and lack of confidence. With
declining production, income distributions decline,
the slackening is thus diffused and intensified, and
the cycle is reversed.
The time required for all this to happen is quite
independent of the time required for any 'origina-
tive impulse to reach its natural saturation point,
in case such an impulse played a part in starting this
particular movement. If the original impulse were
the development of an important new commodity,
a generation might pass before it reached its satura-
tion point if there were no interference from the
spasmodic movements just described. Long before
this, these secondary effects will have produced a
cycle of expansion and contraction, interrupting the
'normal growth-curve'. There may, in fact, be sev-
cal such cycles before this original impulse is cx-
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hausted. The railroad and the automobile has each
played its part in a number of successive cycles.
On the downward course, consumption does not
shrink as fast as production, while credit is contract-
ing. Ultimately, such surplus stocks as may have
accumulated are worked off and the need of replace-
ment counteracts the temporary abnormal shrink-
age of demand for productive equipment and dur-
able goods. As a result demand begins to revive and
the cumulative process starts once more, if not pre-
viously initiated by some random happening that
affords an independent stimulus. At any point, in
fact, this sequence may be altered, stimulated or
dampened, speeded or retarded, by the interposition
of some fresh outside factor. Or its character may be
modified by variations in the behavior of the ele-
ments in the system of business responses, such as
might arise from changes in the credit system or in
the importance of durable consumers' goods, or the
spread of the corporate form of financing of office
and apartment buildings. But this system has suffi-
cient momentum in and of itself to account for a
considerable succession of cycles without constantly
renewed stimulus from outside.
If this is a correct picture of the main determining
features of the typical cycle, the average length is
to be accounted for, not by any periodicity in the
originating forces but by the time required for these
reactions of the business system to run their course.
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If we were to draw a line depicting the original
growth-curve of ultimate demand as it would be if
unmodified, and a second line depicting the derived
demand for durable goods as it would be if it moved
in such a way as to satisfy the original demand in-
stantly, the second line would, as already noted, have
a period corresponding to that of the original line
of growth of original demand, with an apparent lead
of approximately a quarter-cycle owing to the fact
that it reaches its peak at about the time the original
curve is rising most rapidly. But the actual curve of
derived productive activity does not behave in this
way. It reacts on the original curve, modifying the
latter in the direction of its own movements, includ-
ing the tendency to an earlier peak. This reacts back
on the derived curve, causing it to reach its peak
earlier than it would otherwise. This effect is com-
plicated by the fact that the derived productive
activity does not at once rise to the full extent re-
quired to satisfy the increase in original demand, but
lags at first, and then rises even more steeply in the
effort to catch up, and finally is pushed beyond im-
mediate requirements by the effects of speculation
and of competitive duplication. The resulting re-
cession reacts again on the demand for finished
goods, and the natural curve of growth is interrupted
by a decline.
Thus it is natural and logical that there should be
several cycles of derived business activity during the
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course of one major growth-cycle of original demand.
And the duration of these cycles is presumably gov-
erned largely by the time consumed in this process
of lagging and subsequent catching-up and over-
expansion, and in the subsequent process of clearing
the markets and exhausting the excess of durable
goods. This time-interval is dependent upon several
factors,technical, commercial and psychological.
Among these factors are those governing the time
required to produce goods and to bring new equip-
ment to the stage at which its products come on the
market, including the time required to launch and
finance projects of expansion. If the process of
launching and financing projects and completing the
first units of equipment or durable goods consumes
on the average ten months, then it is logical that the
expansion should involve considerably more time
than this, and forty months becomes a rather natural
average period for the entire cycle. A further con-
ditioning factor is the growth of a general spirit of
making business men more ready to build
for the hope of future expansion, and by the
quent evaporation of that spirit. The course of
events is also affected by the continuation of produc-
tion and prices on the basis of standing contracts
made in the past. Another conditioning circum-
stance is the impossibility of developing new wants
fast enough to make effective demand for consumers'
goods expand as fast as income when income is ex-
i8i]STRATEGIC FACTORS IN BUSINESS CYCLES
panding as rapidly as it does on the upgrade of the
cycle.
It would naturally be expected, since all businesses
are affected by the general cycle but not all are under
the same degree of original stimulus, that some may
have, exhausted their original stimulus more com-
pletely than others by the time the general reaction
comes. The original stimulus may be more persistent
or less; the response may be prompter or slower. In
fact, different industries may have different natural
cyclical periods if left to themselves; and impulses
of varying magnitudes in the same industry may tend
toward diverse periods of oscillation. Thus some
industries may be caught by the general decline be-
cause other industries have reached the point of
reaction, though they themselves had not come to
what would be their own natural period of recession.
In such instances they. may lag on the down-turn or
lead on the next up-turn. In extreme instances an
industry may fail to decline with general business,
or it may remain prostrate through more than one
full cycle. A few dominant industries subject to
special conditions may lengthen or shorten one
phase or the other of the cycle, affecting the length
of the entire cycle in this way. Or the same result
may be brought about by purely random forces.
This theoretical picture appears to harmonize
with the observed facts of the cycle, including the
approximate regularity with considerable variationTHE STRATEGIC FACTORS
both in the timing of the general cycle and in the
behavior of the various specific series. It includes
the intensified fluctuations of producers' goods and
durable consumers' goods, the general behavior of
prices, credit and security markets (though the par-
ticular relations of credit to security speculation were
not gone into), and the behavior of incomes, expen-
ditures and savings. Provisionally assuming it to be
a fair picture, as far as it goes, we still have the prob-
lem of the various originating factors, and factors
in the business system of responses to changing situa-
tions. To which, if to any, shall we attach peculiar
strategic importance in controlling and determining
the character of the result? And which, if any, may
themselves be controlled by human action, and so
used to control the outcome? This is, needless to
say, the heart of the question.
Factors of Controlling Importance
For purposes of summary, we are almost forced
to arrange the factors in lists, although this neces-
sarily fails to do justice to their manifold organic
interrelations. They fall rather naturally into three
groups. The first ccrnsiststhe 'originating causes',
random or otherwise, which we may regard as ulti-
mate for our purpose; the second consists of those
elements in the reaction patterns of business which
are directly concerned with bringing about the
familiar forty-month business cycle. The third group
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consists of factors responsible for longer trends and -
theinterrelations between them. Together with the
'originating causes', these may be among the forces
responsible for changes in the character and serious.
ness of the forty-month cycles, or they may possibly
be responsible for other cycles of a longer period,
or for progressive or chronic maladjustments in the
sense of inability to utilize the productive powers
we actually possess. In this third group conclusions
as to causal relationships are based more on theo-
retical analysis and less on inductive evidence, and
are more tentative in character; but if and when the
truth can be discovered about them, they may prove
to be no less important than the factors directly
responsible for the short cycles—possibly even more
so.
First Group: Originating Causes
In this first group belong such random factors as
weather in its effect on crops, wars and other chance
disturbances. These may have regularities of their
own, and they certainly have their own causes; but
their regularities are independent of those of the
business cycle, and their causes are either non-eco-
nomic or are outside the regular course of the busi-
ness cycle. Here belong also such factors as the
origination (in contrast to the rate of development
and exploitation) of new wants, new goods and new
processes and methods of production. These have
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their own tendencies of progressive development and
are characterized by certain irregularities which are,
for all practical purposes, inescapable. These the
business system seizes upon, intensifies and converts
into cyclical movements whose lengths are presum-
ably largely independent of the timing of the natural
irregularities in these basic movements.
In this general class of forces also belong shifts
in foreign trade arising from other causes than the
state of the business cycle in our own country. So
far as business cycles in foreign countries have differ-
ent timing from our own, they may act as random
and originative forces acting on the state of business
in this country.
In this group, wars stand out for several reasons.
They are particularly serious. They are definitely
undesirable, and humanity is developing a definite
ambition to control them. And they constitute the
only item in the list which seems to be of such a
nature as to be really subject to control that might
ultimately succeed in removing it as a disturbing
influence upon the economic system.
It is also true that the development of wants and
the origination of new processes can be stimulated
or retarded by the actions of a government or a
people. On the other hand, the consumers' ultimate
freedom of choice as to the kinds of goods he wants
is one of the last things with which we shall attempt
any general interference, at least in our dealings
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with this grade of economic problem. We are far
from ready to begin dictating to him, as a measure
for the stabilizing of business, when he shall, and
when he shall not, adopt new goods and seek new
kinds of gratification. And while we can pour larger
or smaller funds into industrial research, we can
never guarantee the exact results, how important
any given invention will turn out to be, or whether
it will come to fruition in 1935orin 1937.Inshort,
it seems that we may exercise some little control
over the longer trends in these matters, if and when
we gain sufficient wisdom to know what our welfare
demands; but we can hardly hope to reduce the
changes to perfect uniformity. There will always
be irregularities, and if we have a business system
that converts these irregularities into cycles of pros-
perity and depression, there will always be such
cycles.
With the exceptions already indicated, the factors
in this first group do not appear to be of great strate-
• gic importance for the purposes of humanity seeking
to learn what it may do about this great problem.
This is partly because there is so little that we can
do about them, and partly because, in spite of their
possible importance in initiating business move-
ments, they do not seem to determine the character
of the result which the business system, under the
impact of these forces, brings to pass. To understand
the length, timing and specific features of business
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cycles and kindred movements, we must turn to the
second and third groups of factors.
Second Group: Business Responses Controlling the
Short Cycle
Here the significant possibilities seem to include
the following:
(1)Thetendency to intensified fluctuations of
derived demand for durable goods: both
capital equipment and consumers' goods,
with possible lesser tendencies of the same
sort in the case of raw materials. In the
case of capital equipment this includes the
tendency to competitive duplication and
excess building.
(2) Price movements and the lack of simultaneous
and proportionate change in all parts of
the price system, including wages and in-
terest burdens. Price movements should be
classified into cyclical movements, typically
of moderate amplitude, and other move-
ments due to special causes, such as the
long decline from 1873 to 1896, the rise
from 1897 to 1913,theWar-time rise, the
sharp deflation of 1920-21andthe second
post-Wardeflationwhoseculmination
marked the present depression. The cycli-
cal movements are important causes of con-
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traction and expansion (or of more intense
contraction and expansion than would
otherwise occur), but they are not, like- the
otherthovements,'originatingcauses'.
Their regularity points clearly to the con-
clusion that they arise from other cyclical
conditions. They are to be explained in
terms of factors i, 4 and 6-i i.
Intensifiedmovements of profits derived from
movements of money values and lagging
interest and wage costs, and from changes
in volume of production in connection
with the existence of overhead costs which
do not change proportionately with output.
Movementsof speculative demand for com-
modities.
Speculationin securities.
(6) The effect of confidence or the lack of it on
speculation, on expansion or contraction
of business enterprise and on credit pur-
chases generally, including those of con-
sumers.
Thedependence of consumers' demand on
the volume of income disbursed by busi-
nesses.rrhis joins with the previous factors
to form a vicious circle, reinforcing itself
cumulatively. So much is certain, but the
precise quantitative facts are as yet un-
known: how closely the movements of these
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two quantities correspond and the amount
and timing of any discrepancies. These de-
pend in part on the movements of consum-
ers' credit and plus and minus movements
in savings, and in part on the following
factor.
(8) Shifts in the proportionate distribution of
the national dividend between different
classes and income groups, taken in con-
junction with the diverse habits and stand-
ards of consumption and savings of these
groups. The effect is instability in the pro-
portions of the national income saved and
consumed, beyond what would arise in any
case from changes in per capita real in-
come.
Theexpansion and contraction of credit
granted to both producers and consumers,
makingpossiblediscrepanciesbetween
total income and total spendings, or be-
tween savings and investment. This has
two types of effect. Firstly, it enables the
other forces mentioned to initiate changes
in rates of expenditures and production
with a freedom not otherwise possible.
Secondly, it acts at times as an independent
force to stimulate expansion or enforce
contraction.
(io)The time consumed in financial and physical
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preparation for increased production, and
the resulting tendency to alternate lagging
and hurrying to catch up, by which time
an over-supply is in process of production.
(1i) Thetime necessary to work off excess stocks
and to develop the need for replacements
and in that way to bring about a revival
of demand(ifnot previously brought
about by credit purchasçs or other means)
from the excessively low point reached
when durable goods are not being fully
maintained and kept up to date.
This is a formidable list, though less formidable
than the mass of statistical series which describe the
whole course of successive cycles. Even this list omits
several incidental factors such as the efficiency of
labor and the concentration of managerial effort on
economies and improvements during a depression,
changes in the length of the working day and week
and the development of what is called 'technological
unemployment'.
Possibilities of Control as Guides to Strategic
Importance
All of these eleven factors seem to be of impor-
tance, but some are hardly controllable. And they are
all so interdependent that, of a group of two or more
factors, for example, the demand for capital goods
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and the supply of capital funds, it may be that effec-
tive control of either might serve to control the
others also, and to modify the entire course of the
sequence.
Those least susceptible to control include those
resting on the consumer's freedom to choose what he
will do with his income, and those resting on the
purely physical facts that govern the time taken by
various processes.Business confidence,also, can
hardly be controlled directly. Attempts to modify
it must act through the more tangible conditions
on which it depends. Among the remaining factors,
presumably, are those which are of greatest strategic
importance to us in our relation to this problem.
The tendency to intensified fluctuations of derived
demand, including the demand for the work and
materials involved in producing durable consumers'
goods, as well as producers' goods,of basic im-
portance, in the judgment of the writer. If it could
be controlled in all its manifestations, the primary
result would be a great stabilization of the average
rate of productive activity by cutting off those fluc-
tUations of production which exceed the fluctuations
of consumers' current expenditures. As a secondary
result, consumers' expenditures would themselves
be made far more stable than they now are. Thus
the effects of stabilization would be cumulative, and
the back of the business cycle would be broken. We
have already seen that the magnitudes involved,
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with allowance for cumulative effects, are sufficient
to justify this claim.
While any very close approach to complete stabili-
zation is probably out of the range of possibility so
long as we retain even the main elements of the
present system of private enterprise, a great deal may
still be accomplished if the task is approached with
sufficientresolution and open-mindedness. The
causes of intensified fluctuations are, in part at least,
mechanical relationships as inescapable as the laws
of physics: namely, the relation between changes in
a total stock of durable goods which is increasing
at a fluctuating rate, and changes in the rate of in-
crease of the sme stock. No magic of institutional
formulae can make these two rates equal. If there
is to be approximate stability, there must be some
degree of control of the underlying fluctuations.
If there were no such thing as elasticity of credit
the difficulty would be largely circumvented, but at
a rather heavy price. The elasticity of credit un-
doubtedly facilitates and speeds the process of cap-
ital accumulation by enabling business to secure and
spend at any time larger amounts of capital funds
than have been furnished for the purpose by prior
savings. The ultimate savings can, in a real sense,
be furnished later, out of the increased productivity
of the processes themselves.3 To abandon all this
8Itis not intended to imply that the banks have a magic power to
create something out of nothing. They do have iosver to create addi-
[192tional purchasing power in the form of bank deposits placed at the
disposal of borrowers. This purchasing power does not come out of
anyone's prior abstinence; but it initiates a process of painless quasi-
abstinence consisting simply in the fact that these depositors leave their
accounts with the banks until they see fit to spend them, after which
the recipients do the same. If the only effect of the expansion of de-
posits were to raise prices, there would be simultaneous involuntary
abstinence of a different sort, forced on those who must pay the higher
prices while their purchasing power is not increased. But the typical
effectis only partly of this character, and is largely an increase in
production, with the result that increases of capital goods do not re-
quire equivalent prior sacrifices in See H. 0. Moulton,
Commercial Banking and Capital Formation, Journal of Political
Economy, XXVI, 849, 868-8', November, igi8.
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would have a retarding effect on industrial progress;
though whether it would be as serious as the retard-
ing effect we now experience from depressions is
something no one can prove. If there were no pos-
sibility of expanding credit, increased purchases of
automobiles and residences would be limited to such
current income as the consumer chose to divert from
the fulfilment of other desires, and increased ex-
penditures on capi
to that fraction of
sumer chose not t





tal equipment would be limited
current income which the con-
o spend, or which the business
distribute. Short of this, a corn-
banking system could, by ration-
lish virtually any desired degree
Unofficialprivatetransactions
funds, but the funds would have
to come out of income, not o
elastic expansion afforded by
ut of the resources of
commercial banking.*
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Even this degree of control is too drastic to be seri-
ously considered at present, but milder forms of
control could accomplish much. The possibility of
utilizing them effectively 'will be considered later.
Another line of attack is the attempt to control
directly the volume of production of capital equip-
ment and, if possible, of those durable consumers'
goods whose fluctuations are governed by the same
basic principle of intensification. As to the possibility
of this type of control, it is of the utmost importance
that these productive activities, at least in the field
of capital equipment, are of such a sort that their
timing is not immediately and exactly bound up
with the movements of consumption or of consum-
ers' purchases (which are the last items we shall
probably think of controlling) but are connected
with them by ties that admit an enormous amount
of play within the business system itself.
This fact constitutes the reason for their intense
fluctuations under existing conditions; and at the
same time it affords a ground for hope that some
of them at least might, under other conditions, be
converted into stabilizing rather than unstabilizing
influences. This would be difficult in the case of
housing, and might prove impossible in that of pas-
senger automobiles, especially so long as changes of
style and model are as frequent and important in
the trade as they are at present. And even in the
field of capital equipment the difficulties are enor-
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mous. But it remains true that within this group
are found the only industries in which efforts at
regularization can with any promise at all be applied
directly to the work of production; and that they
are of sufficient importance to afford something àp-
proaching a cure if the difficulties involved can be
successfully overcome.
The hope of control lies in the fact that, while
the behavior of this group of industries is natural,
under the operation of financial interests as seen by
individual producers, itis, with some exceptions,
optional and not compulsory to the extent that sup-
plying consumers who come to buy goods, if the
goods are on hand, may be regarded as compulsory;
or as failing to supply them if they do not come to
buy goods is compulsory. If producers learn to look
at the matter collectively and see that their present
behavior is contrary to their joint interests, as tend-
ing to produce booms and depressions, they can, if
they care enough about it, regularize their purchases
of permanent equipment and see that their inven-
tories of goods do not move up and down in such a
way as to intensify the fluctuations in ultimate con-
sumers' demand. Even the production of durable
consumers' goods can to some degree be regularized,
if the problem is attacked with determination.
Even such a degree of control requires a broader
and more collective view than is common in business.
The steel industry can do little to stabilize the de-
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mand for steel; hence it is quite natural if the en-
deavors of steel producers, so long as they are acting
by themselves, are directed to stabilizing prices at
the expense of stabilizing demand and output. Ac-
tion by the purchasers of steel is essential to the
stabilization of the steel industry. And such action
may not be beyond the reach of possibility when it
is fully realized that to stabilize the demand for
other commodities—for consumers' goods in general
—it is necessary that production and payrolls in steel
(taken as typical of producers' goods in general)
shall be stabilized in order to remove the focus from
which spread the really violent ups and downs in
general purchasing power and in effective demand
for commodities at large.
The primary method of procedure is to budget
capital outlays on a regularized schedule which pro-
vides sufficient reserve capacity for all ordinary peaks
of demand, and which refuses to be stampeded by
the momentary state of the market into violent
speedings-up or slowings-down. This is not an easy
task. To bring about substantial results would al-
most certainly require not only cooperation between
enterprises throughout a single industry but also
affiliations between industries along lines of vertical
integration. The steel industry, as already noted,
cannot do much to stabilize itself because it cannot
by itself stabilize the demand for steel. This has to
be done, if at all, by the industries that consume
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steel. But as we have also seen, these industries, in
turn, stand to gain through the general stabiliza-
tion of purchasing power if the whole program is
successfully carried out. Thus there is a mutual in-
terest which should be strong enough to produce
fairly adequate action, if industry can be
in such a way as to make this interest effective.
Whether this degree of organization can be brought
about without going so far as to make the system of
private enterprise impossible is a question which
can be answered only by the process of experiment.
At the least the change would be an evolutionary
movement going a long way toward a system decid-
edly different from private enterprise as we now
understand it. Not less than a generation would
probably be required for business to make the neces-
sary mental and material adjustments, and a delay
of this length has its own element of danger. To
assume that the economic system will give us un-
limited time to find cures for its worst evils is not
wise.
The same principle of regularization might, to
some extent, be applied to residential construction,
though under greater difficulties, since consumers
can hardly be expected to organize to budget their
collective expenditures on any such long-range pro-
gram. The pressure would have to come from com-
mercial builders, and would need to involve building
ahead of demand to a considerabid extent. In the case
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of automobiles, these methods offer little prospect
of a stabilized production in the face of unstable
demand. Here the control of credit extended to
purchasers appears to afford the only effective hold.
Thus it appears that these factors are strategic in
that they are potentially subject to control, and that
through them something substantial may be accom-
plished. But this can be done only by difficult and
far-reaching measures—measures which we do not
seem to be prepared at present to take. This is quite
natural, but it argues that we do not yet realize the
full gravity of our situation.
If efforts to stabilize private activity in these fields
fail, there is always the possibility of using public
works to redress the balance. If private activity ex-
pands too intensely let public works contract, and if
private activity contracts, let public works expand.
This is not the place to discuss the whole theory and
practice of the control of public works, or the ob-
vious difficulties involved; we may merely note that
public works are a section of this entire field in
which the worst disturbances lie and from which
they spread, and that they are a section of the field
inherently susceptible to control, which could be
used as far as it will go to neutralize the movements
in the rest of the field. The amount of public works
which could, within reason, be concentrated in dull
times, does not appear from the figures as likely to
be large enough, by itself, to counteract even a mod-
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crate depression.4 Such a policy could succeed only
as part of a much larger program.
If such a policy is undertaken, the method of
financing is of vital importance, as affecting another
vital factor: namely, the movements of total pur-
chasing power. Financing by means of taxes which
operate to decrease private expenditures will tend
to neutralize the effect of expanding public works
as a stimulus to total economic activity. Financing
through the use of credit will tend to give it maxi-
mum effect, and the timing of repayment of the
credit will also be of great importance. Repayment
should be made so far as possible in times of active
business when a brake rather than a spur is needed.
Passing on to price movements, and the corre-
sponding changes in the other elements of the price
system, here also we have forces of basic importance.
The present system is a hybrid: neither free nor
stabilized, but free in parts and resistant to change
in other parts. This situation could be altered by
more complete stabilization or by the attempt to
bring about more consistent fluidity. Either might
work better than the system now prevailing. And if
instability of price levels is accepted, the attempt
might still be made to stabilize the personal incomes
of different classes, in the hope that this. will result
4 See Wolman, Planning and Control of Public Works, published
by the National Bureau of Economic Research with the collaboration
of the Committee on Recent Economic Changes, New York, 1930.
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in more stable expenditures and so tend to reduce
indirectly the cyclical fluctuations of production and
prices. At present we are not wise enough to choose
with certainty between these possible courses. We
do not know just what behavior of the price system
is most desirable, just what system of regulation can
best be used to bring it about, or just what adjust-
ment of personal incomes will best promote the ends
in view. Thus we are not mentally prepared for the
effective control of the price factor. Nevertheless it
must be classed among the major factors which are
at least potentially, and to a considerable extent,
controllable.
Stabilization of prices is not impossible. It may be
approached through control of the currency system,
or of credit, or of both. Or it may be approached, less
usefully perhaps, by direct control of each separate
part of the price system. Stabilization of the general
level of prices would have the advantage that it
would carry with it, without further need of con-
trol, stabilization of profits, of the distribution of
income, and to some extent of the more damaging
features of speculation in commodities and securities.
If the prices of particular commodities were left
free to move within a stable price structUre, profits
and losses would not be eliminated, but they would
be freed from the perversions we have noted, which
play so large a part in producing and intensifying
undesirable general fluctuations. They might then
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perform their proper functions of stimulating the
growth of efficient enterprises and the decline or
elimination of inefficient ones, and of serving as a
signal of shortages or surpluses of particular goods
here or there in the economic system, and furnish-
ing the impulse to make good the shortage or eljmi-
nate the surplus. The result would be a vast improve-
ment over a system which gives the same signal
indiscriminately for industry in general and so either
stimulates further general expansion when industry
is already over-stimulated, or further contraction
when it is already depressed.
Passing on to the control of incomes within an
unstable price system, we find that the apparent
sources of instability in our hybrid system are of
two different sorts, giving rise to two divergent
policies. One apparent evil is the instability of in-
comes, the other the rigidity, or sluggishness of
response, of the unit costs of labor and capital. In-
terest charges are largely fixed in money terms, and
salaries and wage rates are relatively sluggish in
their movements, while personal incomes from prof-
its are partially stabilized in the case of dividends
paid by those corporations which are strong enough
to afford adequate reserves for this purpose. Thus
we actually have a certain approach to a system of
stabilized money incomes, but not a consistent ap-
proach. In particular, a sluggish movement of wage
rates is not the same thing as stabilization of wage-
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earners' incomes. In fact, by rendering the unit cost
of labor unresponsive, it may aggravate unemploy-
ment in dull times sufficiently to make the instability
of wage-earners' incomes greater rather than less.
Thus certain features of the situation point toward
the desirability of making personal incomes more
stable than production, and thus breaking into the
vicious circle whereby incpmes fall because produc-
tion has declined and production declines further
because incomes have fallen. Other features of the
situation point toward making the unit costs of labor
and capital more responsive, and thus mitigating
the intensified fluctuations of profits which, as we
have seen, have such a disturbing effect. And of
neither of these policies can it be said that we know
with certainty what its full effects would be.
The first of these policies comes to grips with
the problem of the dependence of consumers' de-
mand on incomes and the dependence of incomes
on the rate of production. This, as just noted, is one
side of the vicious circle of depression—to borrow
a figure of speech from Lewis Carroll's caterpillar,
who assumed that a circle had two sides. At first
sight the dependence of demand on income seems
an inescapable fact; and indeed in its main outlines
it is. But its action is susceptible to modification.
There is every reason to suppose that the variation
of consumers' expenditures is not identical with the
variation of incomes, even now; and the discrep-
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andes may be made to work in the right direction
rather than in the wrong one by a well-considered
use of the mechanisms of credit. Furthermore it
seems certain that we can, if we wish, make the flow
of income to consumers steadier, relative to the total
national dividend, than it now is; for instance, by
means of unemployment reserves. We must, how-
ever, watch the reactions of any such policy on the
investment markets; and also make a wise choice of
plans in order to put the burden in such form as to
afford a maximum incentive to industries to stabil-
ize, and a minimum inducement to workers to
malinger.
We have already seen that the partial stabiliza-
tion of dividends does not stabilize total purchasing
power, but rather concentrates its fluctuations upon
the element of corporate surplus and undivided
profits, and upon the demand for the things on
which these funds are spent. This fact has a moral
for the many who are hoping that unemployment
reserves may help to stabilize consumers' expendi-
tures. They may be made to have this effect, but it
will not follow automatically. The result will depend
on the use made of the reserves, and on whether
independent measures are taken to stabilize produc-
tion in those fields into which the funds. constituting
reserves are likely to flow, in the process of being
invested; and out of which they must come when
the reserves are drawn down in an emergency.
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Without stabilization of the production of capital
equipment and other producers' goods, attempts to
stabilize consumers purchasing power by the set-
ting aside of reserves, either for dividends(as is
already done) or for wages (as is proposed) are likely
to be baffled by the indirect effects of the uses to
which the reserves are put while they are being
held as reserves, and from which they must be with-
drawn when they are paid out to beneficiaries.
If the reserves are put into securities, to be sold
when benefits are to be paid, this means systemat-
ically buying in a dear market and selling in a cheap
or demoralized one. Aside from the losses to the
funds, such a policy might well aggravate business
disturbances more than the distribution of benefits
would mitigate them. A better plan would probably
be some definite provision whereby such securities
could be realized on by being used as a basis for
loans which might serve to neutralize some of the
shrinkage in bank credit which accompanies a de-
pression. To be effective, this might require the
provision in advance of emergency credit organiza-
tions, rather than setting them up after the emer-
gency has become serious. For part of the funds,
'hoarding' during prosperous times may prove the
safest and least disturbing form of investment.
The other policy we are considering—that of mak-
ing unit costs more responsive—points toward the
adjustment of wage and interest rates in terms of
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an index number of prices, so that the sluggishness
of their adjustments may be, so far as possible, over-
come. To be effective, this requires that interest on
long-term loans be not fixed in money, but adjust-
able to a constant purchasing power. Wages and
current interest rates may sometimes keep pace with
prices, but fixed interest on standing loans never
does. Such an adjustment would remove one chief
cause of the misleading and perverted state of gen-
erally swollen profits. It would not, to be sure, elimi-
nate the disproportionate variation of indirect labor
and output which is based on mechanical facts about
which there is presumably nothing to be done. What
can be done, however, is to alter further the sur-
rounding conditions of the wage contract so as to
change the financial effect which this unequal varia-
tion has on the profits of the company and indirectly
on the earnings of the wage earner. The most
obvious measure of this sort is to lay a special charge
on super-active employment to sustain out-of-work
benefits in times of depression.
Clearly, the wage system will not cease to act as
an aggravating factor in the business cycle until it
ceases to be based on relatively stable money rates,
measured in terms of a fluctuating standard of value,
or on rates that lag in their adjustment. It may or
may not be correct policy to maintain real wage rates
in a time of depression. But it is certainly not correct
policy to maintain uncompromisingly a system which
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causes real wage rates automatically to fall as profits
rise and business over-expands, or to attempt to
maintain rates which mean an actual rise of real
wage rates as profits fall and depression spreads and
intensifies. Yet this is—or would be—the result of
sticking to fixed money wage rates at such a time.
Any attempt to do this is probably bound to fail in
its immediate objective, while if it succeeds, it can-
not possibly result in stabilizing actual earnings.
This difficulty has been seen in an unusually in-
tense form in the present depression, because it has
occurred simultaneously with an enormous world-
wide collapse of prices of a basically non-cyclical
sort. It must be admitted that the average cyclical
rise and fall of prices, and especially of costs of living,
is so moderate that a system which should, for ex-
ample, automatically adjust wage rates to a cost of
living index, would have only a small effect either
on the worker or on his employer. Its great useful-
ness would arise in precisely those instances in which
the cycle is complicated by larger price movements
of a non-cyclical character. Wage rates based on a
wholesale price index would have more effect in
stabilizing the real costs of business. To the wage-
earner, they would mean that a standard week's labor
would automatically yieldincreased purchasing
power in the retail markets during business pros-
pçrity and decreased purchasing power during de-
pression. The effect would probably be salutary,
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even from the standpoint of stability of real earnings
for the workers, because it would remove one of the
forces tending to aggravate instability of employ-
ment. If we had a clear choice between stable wage
rates with unstable employment, and unstable wage
rates with stable employment, there could be no
doubt which is preferable.
All of which does not mean that business cycles
are to be cured by such devices as a change
in methods of wage payment. That would merely
remove one aggravating factor, leaving other and
more fundamental causes to be otherwise dealt with.
Speculation in securities is also difficult to control;
indeed complete control and genuine speculation
are contradictions in terms. And speculation may be
affected by whatever is done in other fields, in un-
expected and surprising ways. If restraining measures
prevent funds from being used directly in business
when they are searching for employment, the stock
market is a natural substitute outlet. If unemploy-
ment reserves are accumulated in good times and
drawn upon in times of depression, that may mean
investing the funds in securities when the market
is high and realizing on them when it is low, thus
tending to aggravate both conditions. Such funds
can probably be so handled as to avoid this danger,
but it is a very real one, constituting a rather difficult
problem to be met. In general, however, stabiliza-
tion of production and of aggregate income should
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reduce the fluctuations of the freq funds which find
employment in the market, as well as increase the
stability and certainty of earnings. Aside from set-
ting limits on gambling types of transaction that
make irresponsible use of other people's money and
on the flow of other people's money into such uses
(if possible), and setting higher standards for the
securities thenjselves, it appears that putting the
brakes on speculation must come, if at all, mainly
as the result of action taken elsewhere for the stabili-
zation of prices in general or of production in the
critical fields. Speculation is an active factor, but our
main power to control it is by indirect means.
The behavior of credit has already been mentioned
in other connections as a factor of major Impor-
tance. It is one of the most humbling factors to con-
sider, for the reason that we have thought ourselves
in a position to use it to some extent as a lever for
control; and we find that we not only have not been
able to make it do just what we wish, but also do
not know precisely what we ought to try to make it
do. And we entertain the suspiclirn that the organ-
ized machinery for controlling credit is not so all-
powerful as we have often supposed. Certainly it is
a mistake to expect the existing forms of credit or-
ganization to perform miracles in guiding the course
of business.
The control of discount rates is probably not in
itself sufficient, and there is not at present any adee
[208THE STRATEGIC FACTORS
quately effective means of controlling the total
volume of credit directly; still less of discriminating
wisely between the different uses to which it is put.
So far as concerns the influencing of consumers
expenses, credit in this field lies outside the scope
of our present institutions of control. But this does
not mean that stronger and more positive mechan-
isms cannot be devised, if the need seems sufficiently
urgent.
Here again we have the problem how far control
can go consistently with the continuance of private
enterprise and of the competitive principle. And
here again complete control and private competitive
enterprise are contradictions in terms. Nevertheless
this is perhaps the most all-pervasive agency condi-
tioning the course of business, organized for control
to a limited extent, and with possibilities of con-
trolling influence which go far beyond anything yet
demonstrated.
The reader need not be reminded that the purpose
of these excursions into the field of control is not to
frame a specific policy or to recommend particular
measures; but rather to shed light on the question
which factors among those responsible for business
cycles are of the greatest strategic importance. For
this purpose it is not necessary to select the best
possible devices, but only to show that some form
of effective control is possible. Factors we can con-
trol are for that reason of peculiar importance to
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as human beings faced with a baffling and threat-
ening problem. Such a canvassing of possibilities
should, indeed, be a step toward the framing of a
program; but the achieving of this final goal is a
much longer and larger task, and one of a different
sort.
From this standpoint, then, our study has re-
vealed a number of factors as peculiarly strategic.
Among these are: the intensified fluctuations of
demand for productive equipment; and secondarily
of demand for durable consumers' goods (which are
less easily susceptible to control), price movements,
movements of unit costs and of personal incomes,
and the movement and distribution of credit. The
all-important factor of profits is itself controlled, in
itscyclical movements, by these other elements
which condition it. Of secondary importance (still
from the standpoint of control) is speculation in
commodities and securities. This may, however, like
profits, be influenced indirectly, via the factors which
govern its movements. To all these causal forces the
inherent possibility of control lends a commanding
importance.
Third Group: Factors Responsible for Longer
Trends
In this group belong the longer business trends,
so far as they present problems of adjustment in the
attempt to make full use of our powers of produc-
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don. These longer trends are based on some of the
originating forces already listed, such as inventions
and the development of standards of living, and are
modified by the business system of responses. Among
their most important features are discrepancies be-
tween the rates of change of different economic fac-
tors) and the processes and problems of adjustment
resulting from these discrepancies. Here are included
the following factOrs:
(i) Long-run trends in the development of new
productive processes, tending to increase
productive power and to call for more cap-
ital per worker. Here we have the develop-
ment of mechanization which, if not prop-
erly compensated by adjustments of hours
and incomes and the development of new
goods, may lead to 'technological unem-
ployment'. Irregularities in this movement
are among the causes of short cycles, as
we have seen.
(2) The development of new goods into which
to put our increased producing and con-
suming power. If this process lags, our pro-
ducing power may not be fully utilized.
Here we have also the increased develop-
ment of durable goods and of 'optional
purchases' incident to a rising standard of
living, which, as we have seen, have their
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effect on the character of the short cycles.
Thebalance between consumption and sav-
ing. A rapid increase in incomes may lead
to 'over-saving' in the sense of a rate of
saving too rapid for us to make the adjust-
ments necessary to assimilateit,as our
present system is geared to make them.
This balance between consumption and
saving is affected in turn by the following
factor.
Thedistribution of the national income
among different income groups, which is
at present mainly affected by the propor-
tionate distribution between wages and
property income.
Therelation between wages and interest in
terms of their influence on the relative
costs of labor and capital to employers,
which in turn has an effect on mechaniza-
tion and on the absorption of the supply
of labor into productive employment. As
we have seen, the requirement of labor
costslow enough,relativetointerest
charges, to stimulate full employment, may
be out of harmony with the requirement
of labor incomes large enough to assure
adequate consumption, unless changes are
made in the system of distribution which
[212THE STRATEGIC FACTORS
are more far-reaching than mere adjust-
ments of wage rates.
(6) The apportionment of increased productive
power between more goods and more
leisure, as affected by the length of the
standard working day and week. Here, as
we have seen, there may be a discrepancy
between the length of the working week
necessaryto absorb the existing labor
supply, all the other factors being as they
are, and the length which represents a
desirable balance for the worker himself
between more goods and more leisure.
And as we have also seen, full use of our
actual powers of production for the proper
satisfaction of our wants for goods and for
leisure requires an adjustment between all
these factors, such as we have not yet
learned to make.
('i) Among the forces of more enduring influence
belong certain after-effects of the World
War, especially the deflation of prices, the
dislocation of international trade and in-
debtedness, and the weakening of foreign
financial and economic structures. These
are disturbing forces of the first magnitude,
whose effects have come to a head only in
1929andthe subsequent depression. An
incidental factor is the effect on our do-
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mestic capital markets of the repayment of
our own domestic war debt.
(8) In this group belong perhaps those larger
psychological swings from over-pessimism
to over-optimism which seem to require
more than the length of one short cycle to
develop their full effects.
When we come to consider the possibility of
control, as a guide to the strategic importance of
these factors, we find truly interesting problems. As
compared to the problems of control raised by the
shorter business cycles, there are some increased
difficulties and at least one rather pregnant new possi-
bility. In general, of the factors listed here, those
which can be controlled for one purpose can be
controlled for the other, if we can only decide what
they should be made to do.
The long-run trend toward more efficient produc-
tive processes, while not beyond all possibility of
control, is not a thing which government will lightly
undertake to limit or even to guide. Labor has some
power to limit the introduction of labor-saving de-
vices, but this is far from being a policy of collective
control. It is possible also for government to take a
hand in promoting the development and adoption of
safety devices, as is done by the Bureau of Mines,
which are not of a labor-saving character. But this
again is not likely to lend itself to a deliberate con-
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trol of the net rate at which labor-saving improve-
ment proceeds, in the interests of a considered pro-
gram of 'economic balance'. In the main, the course
of technical invention represents the force to which
other factors must adjust themselves.
Much the same could be said of the development
of new goods. The motive of profits is a powerful
stimulus to private business in precisely this direc-
tion; and while it may be strengthened or supple-
mented, it would be optimistic to expect very radical
changes to result from public efforts directed to this
end. And the psychological factors, as we have seen,
are mainly to be influenced by indirect means.
The after-effects of the World War form a special
group of problems. Among them price movements,
trade barriers and international debts are definitely
within the realm of international action. Such action
could go far toward restoring weakened financial
structures, and even toward mitigating underlying
economic weakness so far as it arises from the split-
ting-up of Europe into uneconomic national units.
Hours of labor and the distribution of the national
income are also clearly subject to control.
The balance between consumption and saving may
prove more difficult to deal with, even granting the
possibility of defining the desirable goal. The choice
of how much of one's personal income to spend and
how much to save is as definite a part of the realm of
personal liberty as the choice of what kind of goods
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to buy, and is almost, if not quite, as unlikely to be
directly controlled. And whatever is done, within
reason, to alter the distribution of income between
wages and incomes from property, the mere upward.
movement of per capita income will tend to cause a
larger percentage of the increased income to be
saved. Workers of many grades contributed large
amounts to the swollen flow of savings during the
last boom, and granted resumption of progress they
will do so again. . ...
Yetthere are possibilities of influencing the flow.
Increasing amounts are saved by corporations; and
if a reduction of the total is really desired, this por-
tion could be reached by the taxing power or other-
wise. And there is another series of measures which
might have an effect in one direction or the other,
in ways to which apparently little serious attention
has yet been paid. These are the measures of insti-
tutionalized saving which are grouped under the
general head of 'social insurance'. Would the general
spread of such measures increase the total amount
of savings or decrease it, over a period measured in
decades? Some are rather casually taking for granted
that the security provided by social insurance and
especially by unemployment insurance will make
workers more willing to spend their free incomes
for consumption, since there will be less need to
build up individual reserves against emergencies.
But granting that there will be an effect of this sort,
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will it be sufficient to outweigh the huge reserves
which the insurance systems will themselves require?
The answer is far from clear. In the insurance
reserves, all workers in the insured classes will be
represented, whereas not all of them would save
voluntarily as individuals. On the other hand, a
given amount of saving will provide far more se-
curity if put in the form of social insurance. In
particular, insurance reserves are calculated on the
basis of spending principal as well as income before
the transaction is closed, whereas individual savings
are to a large extent made with at least the hope of
spending only the income and maintaining the prin-
cipal as a permanent asset. This is especially true in
the United States, where the custom of buying annu-
ities is far less widespread than in some European
countries. Thus the substitution of insurance for
private saving means installing a system under which
there will be more spending in proportion to the
capital funds accumulated than under the system of
private saving in those cases where the saver succeeds
in realizing his ambition to maintain his principal
intact. Over against this stands the fact that the
lower-paid wage-workers as a class do not typically
succeed in realizing that ambition. The crises of
their lives usually force them to spend their princi-
pal; and not much of their accumulation is perma-
nent. Thus the extent to which insurance would
substitute the ultimate spending of one's principal
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for the permanent maintenance of it remains in
doubt, and may depend on how far the principle of
social insurance is extended upward into the better-
paid groups whose members have already achieved a
moderate measure of security and economic stability.
Another important factor will be the adequacy of the
reserves accumulated: whether they are made suffi-
ciently large to meet all demands, or whether serious
emergencies will exhaust them and necessitate the
use of public credit to maintain benefits. If the latter
policy is followed an increase of capital accumula-
tions may be avoided—at a price.
In short, one of the important features of the
spread of social insurance is its effect on the balance
between saving and spending. This effect cannot be
definitely predicted, but can to some extent be
governed, as the system develops, by changes in the
extent, character and policy of the system itself.
Thus we see that a considerable number of the
factors concerned with the longer trends have that
grade of strategic importance which arises from our
power tO influence their action. The problems in-
volved are subtle and difficult, and there is no like-
lihood of our reaching a quick solution of all of
them, and guiding the forces of economic develop-
ment into a regular course of unbroken and un.
marred progress. But the potentiality exists and to
that extent the forces we have dealt with are of
especial strategic importance.THE STRATEGIC FACTORS
Next Steps—the Place of Research
These, then, are the factors of most strategic im-
portance in the business cycle and kindred illnesses
of business, so far as this study has served to reveal
them. They do not offer any easy and simple formula
for the solution of these distressing problems. They
indicate no panacea; they point rather to a deal of
difficult experimenting with new methods of organi-
zation to accomplish new ends—difficult and perhaps
not without danger. There is danger of going too far
to turn back, on roads that lead to destinations we
would not most of us consciously start out to reach.
There is danger of setting up measures of control
before we are wise enough to know just what to do
with them and how to use them in the right way.
And there is danger of doing' nothing until it is too
late, waiting to know just what to do—waiting per-
haps for students to tell us things we can learn only
from experience and to prove to us matters not
susceptible of exact proof. We need more statistical
information; we also need statistics not gathered
merely to describe things but oriented to the pro-
visional diagnoses which need to be tested, and to
the needs of a program the main characteristics of
which can be outlined with the knowledge already
at hand.
It is clear from the foregoing study that a more
adequate diagnosis of business cycles waits on a more
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fully-developed statistical picture of the main quan-
tities in the interrelated network of factors that
governs our economic life. More knowledgeis
wanted as to incomes, consumers' purchases, savings,
investment and the purchase of productive equip-
ment and of producers' goods in general, production
and stocks of goods and credit. Rough approxima-
tions are useful as far as they go, but they fail to
answer some of the crucial questions raised by exist-
ing theories. For this purpose the student will not
find his material sufficient until the figures are accu-
rate enough to reveal minor discrepancies between
these very large totals; and until they are recorded
at short enough intervals to enable him to detect
short leads and lags. He needs to know whether con-
sumers' expenses fluctuate more or less than con-
sumers' incomes and whether either leads the other;
and what discrepancies exist, if any, between savings
and capital expenditures for producers' goods.
In the case of stocks of goods, we have seen that
there is need not only of more complete figures, but
of figures grouped according to the significance of
these stocks in business cycles. As already indicated,
some represent willingness to buy or to produce in
anticipation of demand, and others represent inabil-
ity to sell. Manufacturers' stocks of materials have a
different significance from their stocks of finished
goods. More important probably is the fact that
an increase in some kinds of stocks indicates an
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increased amount of work done and paid for, com-
pared to volume of sales; while the volume of agri-
cultural products varies so much with weather and
other natural conditions that they have very little
significance of this sort.
In the case of credit, we have seen that there is
need, not only of more accurate figures of consumers'
credit, but also of a general segregation of loans
according to the uses to which they are put: whether
to finance consumption, production of consumers'
goods, production of producers' goods, or speculation
in commodities or securities. Volume of deposits and
volume of loans also reveal different features of the
credit situation. Volume of deposits, multiplied by
rapidity of circulation, belongs in the estimate of the
total flow of purchasing power, and under normal
conditions constitutes over 90 per cent of this flow.
Increases and decreases in the volume of loans going
into any given use give an indication of the extent
to which the volume of purchasing power available
for that use exceeds or falls short of the amount re-
ceived from current income.
One phase of this matter which presents an ex-
tremely knotty problem is the question what finally
becomes of the funds (so largely derived from credit)
which flow into the securities markets during a
speculative boom. The proximate and ultimate
effects of such a flow on expenditures for producers'
and consumers' goods are very important to know,
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in attempting to diagnose the relation of movements
in the securities markets to general business cycles.
If the stabilization of the work of installing capital
equipment is of central importance, knowledge of
the facts in this field is correspondingly vital. One of
the first things which will be wanted is better evi-
dence of the extent of excess capacity, present esti-
mates being bafflingly inconclusive for the purpose
in hand. The crux of the problem lies in the fact
that a given amount of theoretical capacity does not
mean that industry is actually equipped for continu--
ous production under normal working shifts and
normal operating conditions, at the rate which the
theoretical capacity seems to indicate. This is true
for four main reasons. One is the existence of sea-
sonal peaks which cannot easily be removed. For
example, mid-summer production of Portland ce-
ment is approximately double mid-winter produc-
tion.5 A second is the lack of uniform standards of
normal working shifts.6 A third is the fact that some
reserves are necessary to provide against interrup-
tions, and the need of repairs. And a fourth is the
fact that reserves even beyond this amount, when
they consist of semi-obsolete equipment, still do not
represent a real surplus for purposes of continuous
5SeeRobert F. Martin, Industrial Overcapacity, an analysis of figures
compiled by the United States Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Com-
merce, Bulletinthe Taylor Society, June, 1932,p.9g.
6Ibid.,p.
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operation, because they are not economically suited
to such use. There is, then, vital need for distinguish-
ing between different grades of equipment on a
basis which is pertinent to the practical needs of the
case.
Semi-obsolete equipment has typically higher op-
erating expense per unit of product than that which
is up to date, but lower overhead costs, since it rep-
resents little or no investment. As a result, it may
represent the cheapest way to handle occasional
peaks or emergencies, as it would be too expensive
to keep first-rate equipment idle most of the time
for the sake of such occasional service; while at the
same time the semi-obsolete units might be quite
uneconomical for continuous service, on account of
their high operating cost. Excess capacity in the
primary sense exists only when there is a surplus of
equipment of such quality as is economical to use
for regular, as distinct from occasional, service; and
this fact indicates the first and most important line
of distinction to be drawn between equipment of
standard and substandard quality.
The rate at which equipment is approaching and
passing this dead-line, coupled with the normal
growth of the industry, is the gauge of the effective
demand for new units for replacements or enlarge-
ments; and this is the vital factor in any program of
stabilized capital expenditures, involving as it would
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the drawing up of a budget idoking some years
ahead, if only as a goal to aim at.
Another obvious field for research lies in studies
of the effects of policies which have been actually
followed, in all the many areas of action which affect
business cycles. It will not be easy to disentangle the
effects of a given policy from those of the ever-vary-
ing conditions under which it is carried out; never-
theless the attempt should yield some useful results.
One of the fields which should be covered consists
of the efforts which have been made to put the other-
wise unemployed to work producing goods for them-
selves and for each other, on a self-sufficing or a
barter basis. These should be studied in the light of
• the possibility of linking up the widespread local
experiments into a nation-wide network which
would have a better prospect of efficiency through
more adequate division of labor and operation on a
larger scale.
Another way in which statistics can render service
consists in studies looking to the setting of standards
of possible achievement on a national scale. Business
has developed the technique of standard-setting as
one of its indispensable tools; and when the nation
begins to think in terms of developing its national
capacities, it also has need of standards as guides to
its efforts. Estimates oEthis sort in the past have been
one-sided and uncritical, drawing vague conclusions
of vast unused capacities but without linking them
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up with the question of potential demand: of the
concrete forms in which the results of such produc-
tive powers could be usefully put.
What is really needed is a serious canvass of the
standard of living available to our people under
reasonably full utilization of our powers of produc-
tion; such canvass to be put into terms of housing
space,bathtubs,refrigerators,centralheating,
clothing, automobiles and other goods, as well as
improved education, medical service, recreational
facilities and leisure. Such a survey would need to
be based on the records which show how groups
with different incomes actually direct their spend-
ings. And it would need to take account of the effect
of a slackening rate of growth of population, and of
the stabilization of the production of capital equip-
ment which is one prerequisite of the achievement
of anything like full utilization of our powers of
production.
A corollary of such a study would carry us into
the problem of the distribution of spending power
necessary to give effect to any given potential stand-
ard of living on a national scale. Another corollary
would be a recognition of the likelihood of increased
savings under the conditions contemplated (includ-
ing the possible development of collective reserves
for unemployment and old age), and a correlation of
such savings with the volume of investment needed
to equip the program at existing technical standards,
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and the possible field for further developments of
capital investment, public and private. Such studies
go far beyond the scope of mere statistical records of
established facts, and are exposed to corresponding
uncertainties; but there is no less need for making
them, to the best of our ability, and revising them
as new experience sheds new light.
When statistical studies have done all they can do,
there will always remain the question of devising
new policies and new instrumentalities for carrying
them out. Here factual research can be of but limited
usefulness. It may help to prevent the repetition of
past mistakes; but the final verdict must be given by
the process of experimentation, or of trial and error.
The stabilization of capital expenditures, for ex-
ample, requires the forming of new types of organi-
zation; and research in the ordinary sense cannot tell
us how to do this. If experimentation waits for the
completion of an adequate program of research, we
shall make little progress. The two lines of attack on
the problem must advance hand in hand.
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